Justification logics refine modal logics by replacing the usual necessity operator with a family of justification terms that embody reasons for the necessity of a formula, rather than simply recording the fact of necessity. Many common modal logics have justification counterparts. The connection between a modal logic and its justification counterpart is through a Realization Theorem, which says that modal operators can be replaced in a precise way with justification terms so that modal theorems turn into justification logic theorems. In this paper we present a new proof of Realization. We use the familiar machinery of consistency properties to prove a weak version, we call it Quasi-Realization. Then we show how to convert Quasi-Realizations into Realizations proper. Unlike most other treatments in the literature, the work here is not propositional, but firstorder. Only one modal/justification logic is discussed, but the methods easily extend to other standard systems.
Introduction
One can think of the modal operator of epistemic logics as representing implicit knowledge. A asserts that A is known/knowable, but no reason is given for this knowledge. Justification logics are modal-like logics of explicit knowledge. In place of is an infinite family of justification terms, and A is replaced with t:A, asserting that A is known for reason t, a justification term. The family of justification terms has operators defined on it. Choice and behavior of operators determines the particular justification logic. This paper does not start at the beginning of the subject. For appropriate background we recommend [3, 1, 2] . * I want to thank an anonymous referee for remarkably detailed and appropriate criticism of earlier drafts, improving the presentation and saving the author from embarrassment. In particular the formulation of, and the need for, Lemma 8.2 are due to this referee.
† This paper is dedicated to Arnon Avron, a friend of many years, and a researcher whose works I deeply admire.
The first propositional justification logic was LP, the Logic of Proofs, corresponding to the familiar logic S4. It was introduced by Artemov as part of a project to provide an arithmetic semantics for propositional intuitionistic logic, [1] . Propositional intuitionistic logic embeds into propositional S4 via the well-known Gödel translation. Propositional S4 in turn embeds into LP via a Realization Theorem. Propositional LP embeds into arithmetic, Artemov's Arithmetical Completeness Theorem.
What does it mean to say that S4 embeds into LP? The justification logic LP is most commonly characterized axiomatically (see Section 6 for a first-order version of this). A quick glance at the standard axiomatization reveals that, if every justification term is replaced with , LP axioms become S4 validities and LP inference rules become S4 inference rules. So this replacement, called the forgetful functor, turns LP proofs into S4 proofs and hence turns LP theorems into S4 theorems. The Realization Theorem tells us the forgetful functor is onto. More precisely, for every S4 theorem there is some way of replacing occurrences by justification terms to produce a theorem of LP. Thus every S4 theorem, involving implicit knowledge, has an explicit counterpart. Indeed, one can always manage so that negative occurrences are replaced with distinct justification variables-in a real sense, these are inputs in a kind of explicit information flow. Generally speaking, every justification logic corresponds to some modal logic in this way, via a Realization Theorem. In this paper we concentrate on LP and S4, but our approach easily carries over to a much more general setting.
Recently, in [4] , propositional LP was extended to a quantified version, FOLP. The motivation was to provide an arithmetic semantics for first-order intuitionistic logic, something that was successfully accomplished. A first-order Realization Theorem was proved, as part of this project, with a proof along the lines of the original one for LP. Generally, but not always, Realization Theorems are given constructive proofs, making use of cut-free sequent derivations. By now there are several algorithms known. It is our intention here to give a rather different proof of realization for first-order LP, a non-constructive version. In a subsequent paper we will convert it into a constructive argument, but the present approach is one of the simplest currently available, even when restricted to the propositional case. The argument proceeds in two stages. First a quasirealization theorem is proved (Section 9). Our work is somewhat related to a result first established in [5] , though the present proof is different and includes the first-order case. Then quasi-realizations are turned into proper realizations (Section 12). It is an interesting point that the first part, introducing quasirealizations, makes use of S4 proofs while the second part, converting quasirealizations away, is by induction on formula complexity. This division will be further explored in a later paper. The two sections just mentioned are the heart of the paper. The rest presents the background that is needed. It is hoped that this background material does not obscure the essence of the argument.
As noted, we begin with a proof of quasi-realization that is non-constructive. This introduces a familiar tool into the array of machinery available for justification logics, the Model Existence Theorem. The Model Existence Theorem for classical first-order logic was introduced by Smullyan in [13] , and again in [14] . It elegantly isolates those properties of consistency needed to carry out a Henkin construction, thus ensuring the existence of a classical model once it is known that an abstract set of syntactic criteria obtains. Rather remarkably then, completeness for axiom systems, for Gentzen systems, for tableaus, for natural deduction systems, as well as interpolation theorems, all reduce to mechanical exercises in the verification of the abstract criteria. Keisler extended the Model Existence Theorem to L ω1,ω in [12] , where it served as a fundamental tool. I extended it to various modal logics in [8] , and again in [9] , and it served the same broad purposes that it did classically. In this paper quasi-realization becomes yet one more application.
The only justification logic examined here is the first-order logic of proofs, FOLP, from [4] . This uses the Model Existence Theorem for first-order S4, but Model Existence Theorems exist for several first-order modal logics, and the proof given here extends to those logics with little difficulty. We leave aside the question of quantified S5, and other modal logics for which the Barcan Formula is valid. Quantified modal logics whose semantics is constant domain do not have consistency properties in the usual sense. This is something that merits further exploration, but is beyond the scope of the present work.
Finally, we reiterate our opening disclaimer: this paper is not self-contained. For background and motivation on justification logics generaly, see [3] . For other proofs of the Realization Theorem, see [1, 5, 6, 11] . For first-order justification logic, specifically FOLP, see [4, 10] .
Languages Used
There are several different first-order languages used in this paper. We collect together information about them in this section.
L M is a standard first-order modal language. Atomic formulas are composed from relation symbols and individual variables x 1 , x 2 , . . ., but there are no constant symbols or function symbols. (This restriction could be relaxed, but we want to keep things simple.) Formulas are built up from atomic formulas using ⊥, ⊃, and ∀. It is easy to introduce other connectives, modal operators, and quantifiers, and we will do so as needed.
We will be mapping modal formulas to formulas of justification logic, and to do this we need to keep track of the various occurrences of . In [6] we introduced annotated formulas to address this issue; for present purposes a simpler version than the one of that paper will do. The annotated modal language, L AM is like the standard first-order modal language L M except for the following.
1. Instead of a single modal operator there is an infinite family, 1 , 2 , . . . , called indexed modal operators. Formulas are built up as usual, but using indexed modal operators instead of . The resulting formulas will be referred to as annotated formulas. We assume that in an annotated formula, no index occurs twice.
If
A is an annotated formula, and A is the result of replacing all indexed modal operators, n , with , regardless of index, then A is a conventional modal formula. We say A is an annotated version of A , and A is an unannotated version of A.
3. Annotations are purely for bookkeeping purposes, keeping track of occurrences. Semantically annotations are ignored.
We begin the discussion of a justification logic language with a propositional version, suitable for LP. Justification terms are built up from justification constants and justification variables. The constants serve to justify "accepted" facts-typically axioms. One can think of variables as place-holders for justifications that could be given as inputs. Then there are build-up rules. If t and u are justification terms, so are t · u, t + u, and !t. The first, t · u is supposed to justify those formulas B such that there is a formula A justified by u with A ⊃ B justified by t. The second, t + u justifies anything that is justified by either t or by u. As to the third, if t justifies A then !t is supposed to justify that fact-it is sometimes called proof checker. There is a rule of formation: if A is a formula and t is a justification term, then t:A is a formula, read "t justifies A."
Next we move to the first-order version, FOLP. A detailed definition can be found in [4] or [10] -here we present a basic sketch. Atomic formulas now are relation symbols applied to individual variables, in the usual way. (Again, we do not have constant or function symbols.) Quantifiers are introduced, also as usual. One more justification term formation rule is added. If x is an individual variable and t is a justification term, then gen x (t) is a justification term. The intention is that if t justifies A then gen x (t) justifies (∀x)A. It should be noted that in gen x (t) the operation symbol is gen x ; we are assuming an infinite family of such operation symbols, one for each x. The individual variable x does not have a free occurrence in gen x (t)-more generally, justification terms do not contain occurrences of individual variables.
The propositional notation t:A is replaced with something more elaborate. If t is a justification term, X is a finite set of individual variables, and A is a formula, then t: X A is a formula. The members of X specify the free individual variables in this formula, while free variables of A that do not occur in X are understood as bound. Thus in t: {x,y,u} A(x, y, z, w), the occurrences of z and w are bound while those of x, y, and u are free. For formal details see [4, 10] .
In an axiomatic proof free individual variables play two different roles. One is simply that of a formal symbol. The Universal Generalization rule says we have a proof of (∀x)A(x) provided we have a proof of A(x). Here x is just a syntactic object. But in addition, an individual variable can serve as a placeholder that can be substituted for. Suppose we have an axiomatic proof of A(x), and 3 is a constant symbol of our language. We can produce a proof of A(3) by going through the proof of A(x) and replacing all free occurrences of x with occurrences of 3 provided universal generalization was never used with x. Similarly for A(4) and so on. Then a proof is something like a proof templatewe can stamp out many concrete proofs from it. But we had to put in a caveat about non-use of universal generalization-the two roles of variables are not compatible. The notation t: X A is intended to separate the two roles individual variables can play. In t: {x,y,z} A(x, y, u, v) the individual variables x and y are free, and can freely be substituted for. (Similarly for z, but since it does not occur in A doing so would not be particularly useful.) When the axiom system for FOLP is given in Section 6 there will be a restriction on quantification that involves them, in axiom B5. The individual variables u and v, while free in A, are bound in the overall formula and are not subject to substitution.
The formal language of first-order LP will be referred to as L F OLP .
The construction behind the proof of the Model Existence Theorem is the familiar one of Henkin. Such a construction requires enlarging the set of individual variables, to provide witnesses for existential statements. For this purpose it simplifies things to introduce what are often called parameters. These are new individual variables that follow all the rules appropriate to individual variables, except that we will never consider formulas in which they are bound. Then any substitution introducing a parameter is automatically a free substitution. Calling a variable a parameter is not a fundamental change-it is simply a restriction on what we will permit ourselves to do with the variable. Any formula with parameters is still a formula; any proof with parameters involved is still a proof.
Introducing parameters into L M or L AM is unproblematic-they are additional individual variables, but we do not quantify them. But introducing parameters into L F OLP requires some comment. Suppose t: X A contains parameters-say v is a parameter that occurs in A. Since parameters cannot occur bound, then v must also appear in X. (Of course a parameter may occur in X without being in A.) We also assume there are no terms of the form gen v (t) where v is a parameter.
* is the language that is like L but with the addition of a countable set of parameters, new individual variables that are never bound. We say a formula of L * is p-closed if the only free variables in it are parameters. (Note that a closed formula of L is automatically a p-closed formula of L * .) Definition 2.2 (Substitution Notation) When necessary, we use (y/v) to represent the substitution that replaces free occurrences of individual variable y with individual variable v. Application of (y/v) to formula ϕ is written ϕ(y/v).
In fact we will mostly be interested in the case where v is a parameter, which guarantees the substitution is free for y. Whenever possible we adopt a common and convenient simplification. We may write a quantified formula, such as (∀y)A(y), and later write A(v), understanding it as short for A(y/v). The notation is directional; A(v) has no meaning unless (∀y)A(y) has appeared first, to specify the variable being substituted for.
Finally we make use of signed formulas. This simplifies things, though it is possible to avoid their use if desired. We use T and F as signs (intuitively representing true and false). If A is a formula of language L then T A and F A are signed formulas of L. Note that signs do not iterate; T F A is not a legal expression, for instance. We extend signing to sets in the obvious way. If S is a set of formulas, T S = {T A | A ∈ S}, and similarly for F S.
Our use of signed formulas comes from tableaus, but tableaus themselves play no role in this paper. Primarily, signs provide a mechanical device for tracking positive and negative subformulas. Even though tableaus do not come up here, a few words about them may make what is happening a bit clearer. Tableaus and sequent calculi are inter-translatable. Corresponding to a sequent A 1 , . . . , A n → B 1 , . . . , B k is the set {T A 1 , . . . , T A n , F B 1 , . . . , F B k }, which one can think of as the members of a tableau branch. The point is that the left side of a sequent arrow corresponds to the sign T , while the right side corresponds to the sign F . Tableaus are refutation systems, while sequent systems are forward reasoning. Then A 1 , . . . , A n → B 1 , . . . , B k should be so (provable, valid) just in case {T A 1 , . . . , T A n , F B 1 , . . . , F B k } is not so (leads to closure, is not satisfiable). This further suggests a connection between the formula
and as a special case, between B 1 and {F B 1 }, and indeed there is one. These comments may make following some of the subsequent formal material a bit easier.
First-Order Modal Semantics
The Model Existence Theorem is about modal satisfiability and so we provide a definition of satisfiability for formulas of L M and L * M , for reference purposes. There are several versions of quantified modal logic around-we will be using a semantics that assumes monotonicity. 1. G is a non-empty set (of possible worlds).
2. R is a binary accessibility relation on G, reflexive and transitive.
3. D is a domain function, mapping members of G to non-empty sets, and meeting the monotonicity condition: if Γ, ∆ ∈ G and ΓR∆, then D(Γ) ⊆ D(∆). We call ∪{D(Γ) | Γ ∈ G} the domain of the model.
4.
I is an interpretation function, mapping each n-place relation symbol and each member of G to an n-place relation on the domain of the model. 
5. M, Γ v (∀x)ϕ iff M, Γ w ϕ for every valuation w that agrees with v on all variables except possibly x, and w(x) ∈ D(Γ).
Notice that the atomic case allows truth of R(x 1 , . . . , x n ) at a possible world under a valuation that assigns some variables values not in the domain of that world. This is a minor point however, because of the way we restrict things in our definition of validity. (There are several essentially equivalent ways this issue could have been dealt with.) Note that, by monotonicity, if a valuation lives in a possible world on A it also does so in any world accessible from that one.
Truth of a formula ϕ, at a possible world Γ, under a valuation v, only depends on the behavior of v on free variables of ϕ. More precisely, if v and w agree on the free variables of ϕ then M, Γ v ϕ iff M, Γ w ϕ.
Consistency Properties and the Model Existence Theorem
An S4 consistency property is a collection of sets of signed modal formulas involving parameters, meeting certain conditions, [8, 9] . Notation: if S is a set of signed formulas, by S is meant {T A | T A ∈ S}.
Definition 4.1 Let C be a collection of non-empty sets of signed p-closed formulas in the language L * M . C is an S4 consistency property provided, for each S ∈ C: 0. not both T A ∈ S and F A ∈ S for any atomic formula A; also T ⊥ / ∈ S;
Definition 4.2 A set S of signed formulas (with or without parameters) is S4 satisfiable if there is some model M, some possible world Γ in the model, and some valuation v that lives in Γ on each formula in S and:
And now we have everything we need to state the Model Existence Theorem.
Theorem 4.3 (Model Existence
Theorem for First-Order S4) If C is an S4 consistency property and S ∈ C then S is S4 satisfiable.
We do not prove this here. Full proofs can be found in [8, 9] . Formulas appearing in consistency properties are in the language L * M . However, closed formulas of L M are p-closed formulas of L * M , so we immediately have the following.
Corollary 4.4 Suppose C is an S4 consistency property, S is a set of signed closed formulas of L M , and S ∈ C. Then S is S4 satisfiable.
An Example-Axiomatic Completeness
Consistency properties can be used to prove completeness for axiomatic formulations, sequent calculus formulations, and tableau formulations. In addition they can be used to provide proofs of compactness, Löwenheim-Skolem, and interpolation theorems. In this section we briefly sketch a proof of completeness for an axiomatic formulation of first-order S4, since it is a natural lead-in to the proof of quasi-realization that follows later.
The axiom system we use has been designed to make application of the Model Existence Theorem straightforward. Completeness of more conventional axiom systems, not involving parameters, then follows using a translation process. Since this is not the subject of the present paper, we omit these details.
The language involved is L * All axioms are p-closed, and the rules of inference preserve this. Consequently all theorems, indeed, all formulas occurring in proofs, are p-closed.
Call a set S of p-closed signed formulas of L * M inconsistent if there are finite sets Γ and ∆ such that T Γ ∪ F ∆ ⊆ S and Γ ⊃ ∆ is axiomatically provable. Call S consistent if it is not inconsistent. Let C ax be the collection of all sets that: 1) are consistent in this axiomatic sense and 2) omit infinitely many parameters. It is an exercise to check that C ax is an S4 consistency property. Once this is done, completeness is an easy consequence. Suppose A is a closed formula of L M that is not axiomatically provable. It follows that the set {F A} is consistent, and hence in C ax . By Corollary 4.4 to the Model Existence Theorem this set is S4 satisfiable, and hence A is not S4 valid. This establishes completeness for closed formulas of L M .
The Justification Logic FOLP
First-order justification logic, FOLP, has a standard axiomatic formulation. Here are the axioms and rules; we refer to [4] for a detailed discussion. We will need a few explicit consequences, and we present them in this section.
In the following X denotes a finite set of individual variables. If y is an individual variable, then Xy is short for X ∪ {y}, and it is assumed that y ∈ X. Axioms are instances of axiom schemes, listed below. A and B are formulas, s and t are justification terms, and y is an individual variable.
A1 Classical axioms of first order logic. We assume these consist of all tautologies, and instances of the two axiom schemes, (∀x)A(x) ⊃ A(y) (where y is free for x in A), and (∀x)(A ⊃ B) ⊃ (A ⊃ (∀x)B) (where x is not free in A).
where A is an axiom and c is a proof constant
The final rule, R3, is called axiom necessitation. It is often restricted through the use of constant specifications, but we do not discuss this machinery here. It can be introduced into our constructions, but it adds complexity without changing anything essential. We do, however, make a few additional comments concerning constant specifications in Section 11.
We will be interested in FOLP with parameters-recall the languages L F OLP and L * F OLP that were defined in Section 2. Formally, let FOLP * be the logic characterized using the axiom schemes and rules above, but in which each line of a proof must be a formula of L * F OLP , that is, must be a formula possibly containing parameters, but in which parameters cannot occur bound. Since every L F OLP formula is also an L * F OLP formula, the logic FOLP is a sublogic of FOLP * . But in a certain sense the converse is also true, since L * F OLP formulas are just L F OLP formulas with additional free individual variables. Nonetheless, the use of parameters is restricted, and we need to be careful with them. Here are a few items that will be used in what follows, and which address the issue of how parameters behave.
Theorem 6.1 Suppose P is an axiomatic proof in FOLP * and v is a parameter that occurs in the proof. Let x be an individual variable, not a parameter, that does not occur in the proof. Replace all occurrences of v in P with occurrences of x-call the result Q. Then Q is also a proof in FOLP * .
Proof Straightforward induction on proof length.
The following shows that FOLP * is a conservative extension of FOLP.
Proof Begin with an axiomatic proof of A in FOLP * and, by successive application of Theorem 6.1, eliminate all occurrences of parameters. The result will be a proof in FOLP. Since A contained no parameters the process does not change it, so the result is a proof of A in FOLP.
Universal generalization requires some care when parameters are involved, since parameters cannot be quantified. Fortunately we have the following workaround.
is a formula of L * F OLP , v is a parameter that does not occur in it, and A(v) is the result of substituting v for all free occurrences of
Proof Begin with a proof of A(v) in FOLP * . Using Theorem 6.1 replace v throughout the proof with z, an individual variable that is not a parameter and that does not occur in the proof. The result is a proof of A(z). Then by Rule R2, (∀z)A(z) is provable. But (∀z)A(z) ⊃ A(x) is an instance of universal instantiation, and we conclude A(x) by R1, and then (∀x)A(x) using R2. (The detour through variable z was necessary because x might have occurred somewhere in the proof of A(v).
The Internalization Theorem (and its closely related Lifting Lemma) plays a fundamental role in justification logics. A standard treatment for FOLP can be found in [4] . We need variants that pay attention to the role of parameters. Only one step in what follows is different from the usual arguments but since the results play a critical role, it is best to display the details. Recall that, since parameters cannot be bound, if any parameters appear in A, and t: X A is an FOLP * formula, those parameters must also appear in X. It is common to state versions of the Internalization Theorem using a notion of deduction from premises, rather than just that of proof. A deduction in axiomatic FOLP or FOLP * is like a proof, but allowing premises, and restricting universal generalization (R2) so that it cannot involve an individual variable that is free in any premise. As usual, we write A 1 , . . . , A n B to mean that B has a derivation from A 1 , . . . , A n . Theorem 6.4 Let p 1 , . . . , p n be justification variables, and suppose p 1 : Z A 1 , . . . , p n :
where Z is the set of all parameters that occur in A 1 , . . . , A n , or B. Then there is a justification term t such that
Proof The argument is by induction on the derivation of B from the premises
1. B is an axiom of FOLP * . This case requires some adjustment from the argument in [4] . That argument used an application of Rule R3 directly but now, if B has parameters c: ∅ B isn't an L * F OLP formula. Instead we take a small detour.
Say the parameters that occur in B are u 1 , . . . , u k (there may be nonparameter individual variables as well, but they don't concern us now). Let us write B as B(u 1 , . . . , u k ). Let x 1 , . . . , x k be distinct individual variables that are not parameters and that don't occur in B, and substitute them for the parameters, getting B(x 1 , . . . , x k ). Since we have axiom schemes, this is also an axiom, and contains no parameters. Now using Rule R3, for some justification constant c: ∅ B(x 1 , . . . , x k ) is provable. By repeated use of A3, c: Z B(x 1 , . . . , x k ) is also provable, where Z is like Z except that parameters u 1 , . . . , u k have been replaced with variables
Then by repeated use of Universal Instantiation, c: Z B(u 1 , . . . , u k ) is provable, hence derivable from any set of premises. Let t = c. 4. B follows by Rule R2. This is similar to case 2, but uses B5. Note that any variable generalized on cannot be in Z since members of Z are parameters.
B is one of the premises, say p
5. B follows by axiom necessitation. This is also similar to case 2, but uses A3 and B4.
Corollary 6.5 (Internalization) Let p 1 , . . . , p n be justification variables, and suppose that in FOLP * , p 1 : X1 A 1 , . . . , p n : Xn A n B, where X i is exactly the set of parameters that occur in A i , for each i = 1, . . . , n. Then there is a justification term t such that p 1 : X1 A 1 , . . . , p n : Xn A n t: X B in FOLP * , where X is exactly the set of parameters that occur in B.
Proof Suppose p 1 : X1 A 1 , . . . , p n : Xn A n B in FOLP * , where X i is exactly the set of parameters that occur in A i . Let Z be the set of parameters occurring in any of A 1 , . . . , A n or B. Making use of both A2 and A3, p i : Xi A i ≡ p i : Z A i , for i = 1, . . . , n. Then p 1 : Z A 1 , . . . , p n : Z A n B in FOLP * , so by Theorem 6.4, p 1 : Z A 1 , . . . , p n : Z A n t: Z B in FOLP * , for some t. Again using A2 and A3, t: Z B ≡ t: X B, where X is exactly the set of parameters occurring in B. It follows that p 1 : X1 A 1 , . . . , p n : Xn A n t: X B in FOLP * .
We note that, in the usual way, the results above concerning deductions can be converted into results about provability. In particular, here is the version we will use later on. Suppose (p 1 : X1 A 1 ∧ . . . ∧ p n : Xn A n ) ⊃ B is provable in FOLP * , where X i is exactly the set of parameters that occur in A i . Then there is some t so that (p 1 : X1 A 1 ∧ . . . ∧ p n : Xn A n ) ⊃ t: X B is provable in FOLP * , where X is the set of parameters that occur in B.
Corollary 6.6 (Lifting Lemma, parameter version) Suppose B is provable in FOLP * , and X is exactly the set of parameters that occur in B. Then there is a justification term t such that t: X B is provable in FOLP * . We can take t to have no justification variables.
Proof The first part of this is simply Corollary 6.5 with no premises involved. The second part follows from an examination of the proof of Theorem 6.4-the only step that introduces justification variables into t is step 2, which cannot arise now since there are no premises involved.
Corollary 6.7 (Lifting Lemma, no parameter version) Suppose B is provable in FOLP, and X is exactly the set of free variables that occur in B. Then there is a justification term t such that t: X B is provable in FOLP. Again we can take t to have no justification variables.
Proof This has an uncomplicated direct proof, but at this point we can derive it from work above, and it might be fun to do so. Let us say the free variables of B are x 1 , . . . , x n , and write B(x 1 , . . . , x n ). Since this is provable in FOLP, so is (∀x 1 ) . . . (∀x n )B(x 1 , . . . , x n ). Trivially this is also provable in FOLP * . Then using universal instantiation, so is B(v 1 , . . . , v n ), where v 1 , . . . , v n are distinct parameters. By Corollary 6.6, t: {v1,...,vn} B(v 1 , . . . , v n ) is provable in FOLP * for some justification term t without justification variables. Then by Corollary 6.3, (∀x 1 ) . . . (∀x n )t: {x1,...,xn} B(x 1 , . . . , x n ) is provable in FOLP * , and hence in FOLP by Corollary 6.2. Then by universal instantiation, t : {x1,...,xn} B(x 1 , . . . , x n ) follows.
We informally say that t internalizes the proof of B when t: X B is provable as in the last two Corollaries above.
Annotated Consistency Properties
In Section 2 we defined a language, L AM , that is like L M except that modal operators are annotated. This is so that we can keep track of particular occurrences of . We will be using signed annotated formulas throughout this section.
The notion of an S4 consistency property was given in Definition 4.1. We now modify that to an annotated S4 consistency property. Formulas now are in the annotated language L * AM . The sharp operation needs to be modified. If S is a set of signed annotated formulas, by S is meant {T n X | T n X ∈ S for some n}. Conditions 0 -4 from Definition 4.1 formally read the same as before, except that formulas are annotated. Conditions 5 and 6 have the following obvious changes:
Here are two examples. Suppose C is an annotated consistency property and S ∈ C. Suppose F 2 P ⊃ 1 Q ∈ S. Then by condition 2, S ∪ {T 2 P, F 1 Q} ∈ C. Again, suppose C is an annotated consistency property, S ∈ C, and S = {T 3 A, F 5 B, T 2 C, F 7 D}. By condition 6 above, both {T 3 A, F B, T 2 C} and {T 3 A, T 2 C, F D} must be in C.
Being an annotated consistency property is a stronger requirement than just being a consistency property. If we happen to have an annotated consistency property, and we erase the indexes, we have a consistency property and hence members are satisfiable.
Quasi-Realizations
We now make use of FOLP * to define an S4 annotated consistency property. How we do this has a clear relationship with the axiomatic completeness argument sketched in Section 5. The result gives us the first part of a proof of realization for FOLP-we do not get a full realization theorem, but we get what we call a quasi-realization theorem. In Section 12 this will be built upon to produce a proper realization result.
We begin by defining a map from L * AM , signed annotated modal formulas, to sets of signed L * F OLP formulas. From now on we assume that p 1 , p 2 , . . . is an enumeration of all justification variables of FOLP with no variable repeated, fixed once and for all. 
T A ⊃
4. In the following, X is the set of free variables of A (which includes parameters, if present).
. . , F U k ∈ F A and t is any justification term}.
5. The mapping is extended to sets of signed annotated formulas by letting
Comments This is too simple to be a formal theorem, but it plays a significant role in our work. It is an easy verification by induction on formula complexity that, for an annotated formula A in L * AM , the signed formula T A and every member of T A have the same free individual variables. In particular, they have the same parameters, and the same non-parameters. Similarly for F A.
As a special case, if A is p-closed so are all members of T A and F A . Similarly if A is in the language L F OLP , and so has no parameters, the members of T A and F A will also be in the language L F OLP . For quasi-realization we will primarily be interested in the p-closed case, but it is still necessary to consider free variables generally, to cover things like step 3 in the example below. Also, for converting quasi-realizations to realizations, free variables that are not parameters are needed.
The following Lemma is needed for the proof of Theorem 9.1, but can be stated and proved at this point. Recall the substitution notation given in Definition 2.2.
Lemma 8.2
Let ϕ be a formula of L * AM , and v be a parameter. If T ψ ∈ T ϕ(y/v) then there exists a signed formula T ψ ∈ T ϕ such that ψ = ψ (y/v). Similarly for the F -signed case.
Proof The proof is by induction on the complexity of ϕ.
1. ϕ is atomic. If T ψ ∈ T ϕ(y/v) then ψ = ϕ(y/v), so we can take ψ = ϕ.
Similarly for the F case.
2. ϕ = A ⊃ B, and the result is known for A and for B. This case is straightforward and the argument is omitted.
3. ϕ = (∀x)A and the result is known for A. We consider the T -signed case-the F -signed one is slightly more complicated and we leave it to the reader.
If x = y, ϕ(y/v) = [(∀x)A](y/v) = (∀x)A = ϕ so things are simple; we can take ψ = ψ.
Now suppose x = y, and T ψ ∈ T ϕ(y/v) . Then T ψ ∈ T [(∀x)A](y/v) = T (∀x)[A(y/v)] so ψ = (∀x)B where T B ∈ T A(y/v) . By the induction hypothesis, there exists T B ∈ T A so that B = B (y/v). Now set ψ = (∀x)B . Then T ψ = T (∀x)B ∈ T (∀x)A = T ϕ and ψ (y/v) = [(∀x)B ](y/v) = (∀x)[B (y/v)] = (∀x)B = ψ.
4. ϕ = n A, and the result is known for A. Again we consider the T -signed case and leave the F -signed one to the reader.
If y is not free in
Suppose y is free in A, and T ψ ∈ T ϕ(y/v) . Then T ψ ∈ T [ n A](y/v) , so ψ = p n : X B where T B ∈ T A(y/v) and X is the set of free variables of A(y/v). Note that X doesn't include y, but must include v since y is free in A. By the induction hypothesis there exists T B ∈ T A with B = B (y/v). Now let ψ = p n : Xy B . We have T ψ = T p n : Xy B ∈ T n A (recall that y is free in A and hence also in B ). And also, A(x, v) , where v is a parameter and A(x, v) is an atomic formula.
. .} where t 1 , t 2 , . . . are all the justification terms.
F (∀x)
. . are all the disjunctions of formulas of the form t: {x,v} A(x, v) for any justification term t. It will be shown in the next section that every provable closed formula of first-order S4 has a quasi-realization that is provable in FOLP.
A Quasi-Realization Theorem
In this section we define an annotated S4 consistency property; call it C q (the subscript is to suggest quasi-realization). The definition is very similar to that for the consistency property C ax used as an example in Section 5, except that there is a detour through FOLP * . Call a set S of signed p-closed formulas of L * AM inconsistent if there are finite sets Γ and ∆ of L * F OLP formulas such that Γ ⊃ ∆ is provable in FOLP * , and T Γ ∪ F ∆ ⊆ S ; call S consistent if it is not inconsistent. Let C q be the collection of sets that are: 1) consistent in this sense and 2) omit infinitely many paramters. Note that members of C q are sets of modal formulas in L * AM , while provability questions are shifted to FOLP * .
Theorem 9.1 C q is an annotated S4 consistency property.
Proof For the entire of what follows, assume S is a set of signed p-closed formulas of L * AM that omits infinitely many parameters. We show that each part of Definition 4.1 (as modified in Section 7) is true for S by showing that assuming the contrary of any of items 0-6 implies that S / ∈ C q . 0. Suppose A is atomic, and both T A and F A are in S. Let Γ = ∆ = {A}. Then T Γ = {T A} = T A ⊆ S and F ∆ = {F A} = F A ⊆ S . Since A ⊃ A is provable in FOLP * , that is, Γ ⊃ ∆, this implies that S is not consistent, and so S / ∈ C q . For similar reasons, T ⊥ / ∈ S.
1. Suppose T A ⊃ B ∈ S but also S ∪ {F A} / ∈ C q and S ∪ {T B} / ∈ C q . Since S omits infinitely many parameters, so does S ∪ {F A}, so since S ∪ {F A} / ∈ C q , it must be inconsistent in the present sense. Then there are finite sets Γ A and ∆ A of L * F OLP formulas with T Γ A ∪ F ∆ A ⊆ S , and there are L * F OLP formulas A 1 , . . . , A m with F {A 1 , . . . , A m } ⊆ F A so that we have provability in FOLP * of the following.
Similarly since S∪{T B} / ∈ C q there are finite sets Γ B and ∆ B with T Γ B ∪ F ∆ B ⊆ S , and there are formulas B 1 , . . . , B n with T {B 1 , . . . , B n } ⊆ T B so that we have FOLP * provability of the following.
Let Γ = Γ A ∪ Γ B and ∆ = ∆ A ∪ ∆ B . Then the provability in FOLP * of (1) and (2) gives us provability in FOLP * of the following.
By classical logic, formulas (3) and (4) together imply the following, where i ranges over 1, 2, . . . , m and j ranges over 1, 2, . . . , n.
Since each T A i ⊃ B j is in T A ⊃ B and hence in S , and T Γ∪F ∆ ⊆ S , provability of (5) in FOLP * gives us the inconsistency of S, and hence S / ∈ C q .
2. Suppose F A ⊃ B ∈ S but S ∪ {T A, F B} / ∈ C q . S omits infinitely many parameters, hence so does S∪{T A, F B}. Then since S∪{T A, F B} / ∈ C q there must be finite sets Γ and ∆ of L * F OLP formulas with T Γ ∪ F ∆ ⊆ S , and there are L * F OLP formulas A 1 , . . . , A m and B 1 , . . . , B n with T {A 1 , . . . , A m } ⊆ T A and F {B 1 , . . . , B n } ⊆ F B so that we have FOLP * provability of the following.
It follows by classical logic that we also have provability of the following, i ranging over 1, . . . , m and j ranging over 1, . . . , n.
Since each F A i ⊃ B j ∈ F A ⊃ B , this says that S is inconsistent, and hence S / ∈ C q .
Remark. The disjunction in formula (6) can be replaced by a simpler one. Instead of i,j (A i ⊃ B j ) with i ranging over 1, . . . , m and j ranging over 1, . . . , n, we could use the following, with the same ranges for i and j as before:
) (the use of 1 is arbitrary).
3. Suppose T (∀x)ϕ(x) ∈ S but S ∪ {T ϕ(v)} / ∈ C q , for some parameter v. S ∪ {T ϕ(v)} omits infinitely many parameters, since S does, so there must be finite sets Γ and ∆ of L *
we have FOLP * provability of the following.
A small complication now arises. The formula ϕ(x) may already contain occurrences of v, so while ϕ(v) = ϕ(x)(x/v) it does not follow that ϕ(x) = ϕ(v)(v/x), and similarly for each ϕ i . This is taken care of by Lemma 8.2. Since ϕ(v) = ϕ(x)(x/v), for i = 1, . . . , n there is some ϕ i (x) so that T ϕ i (x) ∈ T ϕ(x) and ϕ i (v) = ϕ i (x)(x/v) = ϕ i (v). Then using universal instantiation, (∀x)ϕ i (x) ⊃ ϕ i (v) for each i, and so we have provability of the following,
but also, for each i, T (∀x)ϕ i (x) ∈ T (∀x)ϕ(x) , so the provability in FOLP * of (7) says S is inconsistent, hence S / ∈ C q .
4. Suppose F (∀x)ϕ(x) ∈ S but S ∪ {F ϕ(v)} / ∈ C q for every parameter v. Let r be a parameter that does not occur in S (recall that S omits infinitely many parameters). Then S ∪ {F ϕ(r)} / ∈ C q , so there are finite sets Γ and ∆ of L * F OLP formulas with T Γ ∪ F ∆ ⊆ S , and there are L * F OLP formulas ϕ 1 (r), . . . , ϕ n (r) with F {ϕ 1 (r), . . . , ϕ n (r)} ⊆ F ϕ(r) such that the following is provable in FOLP * .
Γ ⊃ ∆ ∨ {ϕ 1 (r), . . . , ϕ n (r)} (8)
Just because F ϕ i (r) ∈ F ϕ(r) , it does not follow that F ϕ i (x) ∈ F ϕ(x) , but we can appeal to Lemma 8.2 as we did in the previous case. For each i there is some ϕ i (x) so that F ϕ i (x) ∈ F ϕ(x) , and ϕ i (r) = ϕ i (x)(x/r) = ϕ i (r). Then from (8) we have provability of the following.
Γ ⊃ ∆ ∨ {ϕ 1 (r), . . . , ϕ n (r)} (9) Recall that for each signed formula Z, members of the set Z and Z itself all have the same parameters. Since r does not occur in S, it does not occur in Γ or ∆. Then, using Corollary 6.3 and classical logic, the provability in FOLP * of (9) gives us the FOLP * provability of the following. (10) gives us the inconsistency of S, and hence S / ∈ C q .
5. Suppose T n A ∈ S but S ∪ {T A} / ∈ C q . S ∪ {T A} omits infinitely many parameters. Then since S ∪ {T A} / ∈ C q there are finite sets Γ, ∆, and
Let X be the set of parameters of A, which is the same as the set of parameters of A i for each i. It follows from the provability in FOLP * of (11) and Axiom B1 that we have FOLP * provability of the following.
Since T p n : X A i ∈ T n A for i = 1, . . . , k, the provability in FOLP * of (12) implies S is inconsistent, and hence S / ∈ C q . 6. Suppose F n A ∈ S but S ∪ {F A} / ∈ C q . S ∪ {F A} omits infinitely many parameters, since S does. Then there must be finite sets Γ and {A 1 , . . . , A k } consisting of L * F OLP formulas with T Γ ⊆ S and F {A 1 , . . . , A k } ⊆ F A so that the following is provable in FOLP * .
Γ ⊃ {A 1 , . . . , A k } All members of S are of the form T ni H i , and so members of S are of the form T p ni : Xi G i where X i is the set of parameters of G i . Let us say Γ = {p n1 : X1 G 1 , . . . , p nm : Xm G m }, so we have provability of the following.
Then by Corollary 6.5 and the provability in FOLP * of (13), the following is provable, for some justification term t, where X is the set of parameters of A 1 ∨ . . . ∨ A k , which is the same as the set of parameters of A.
Now T p ni :
Then the provability in FOLP * of (14) implies that S is inconsistent, and hence S / ∈ C q .
Corollary 9.2 Every closed formula of L M that is provable in first-order S4 has a quasi-realization that is provable in FOLP.
Proof Assume A is a closed formula of L M that is provable in first-order S4. Annotate the occurrences of in A to produce a closed annotated formula A . Since A is provable, A is valid in the family of Kripke first-order S4 models, and it follows that {F A } is not satisfiable (recall that semantically the annotations play no role). But since A is a closed formula of L AM it is trivially a p-closed formula of L * AM . By Theorem 9.1, C q is an annotated consistency property, so by the Model Existence Theorem its members are satisfiable. Then {F A } / ∈ C q , and thus the set is inconsistent in the sense used to define C q . Then there are U 1 , . . . , U n with F U 1 , . . . , F U n ∈ F A so that U 1 ∨ . . . ∨ U n is provable in FOLP * . Since A , like A, contains no parameters, neither does any U i , and thus each U i is in the language L F OLP . Then U 1 ∨ . . . ∨ U n is provable in FOLP by Corollary 6.2, and hence is our provable quasi-realization of A.
Corollary 9.3 Every formula of L M , closed or not, that is provable in firstorder S4 has a quasi-realization that is provable in FOLP.
Proof Suppose A is a formula of L M that is S4 provable, but which may contain free variables (not parameters, of course). Let ∀A be the universal closure of A, which is also provable. By the previous corollary this has a quasi-realization that is provable in FOLP. This quasi-realization is of the form U 1 ∨ . . . ∨ U n where for each i, F U i ∈ F ∀A (where A is an annotated version of A). By Definition 8.1, each U i must be of the form ∀D i , where D i is a disjunction of members of F A , with signs removed. By classical logic,
is provable in FOLP, and it follows that D 1 ∨ . . . ∨ D n is also provable. But this is, itself, a disjunction (ignoring associativity issues) of formulas V where F V ∈ F A , and hence is a quasi-realization of A.
Realizations
The machinery introduced below for our definition of realizations is rather different than usual, but the outcome is the same and the machinery is more appropriate for our purposes. We parallel the definition of quasi-realization from Section 8, but now disjunctions do not appear where they previously did in cases 3 and 4. We still assume that p 1 , p 2 , . . . is an enumeration of all justification variables of FOLP, with no justification variable repeated. It is important to note that parameters now play no role.
] associates with each signed formula of L AM a set of signed formulas in the language L F OLP . It is defined recursively, as follows.
4. In the following, X is the set of free variables in A.
, where t is any justification term}.
5. The mapping extends to sets of signed annotated formulas by letting
. For a formula A in the language L M , without annotations, a normal realization for A is any normal realization for A , where A is an annotated version of A. 
About Substitution
In the next section we will be making considerable use of substitutions. The ones we need do not substitute for individual variables, instead they replace justification variables with justification terms. A substitution is a function σ = {p i1 /t 1 , . . . , p in /t n }, that maps justification variable p i k to justification term t k , and is the identity otherwise (it is assumed that each t k is different from p i k ). The domain of σ is {p i1 , . . . , p in }. For a formula A of L F OLP , the result of applying a substitution σ is denoted Aσ, and likewise tσ is the result of applying substitution σ to justification term t.
If A is a theorem of FOLP and σ is a substitution, Aσ will also be a theorem of FOLP. This is easy to see, because substitutions turn axioms into axioms (because axiomatization is by schemes), and turn rule applications into rule applications. But the role of constants must change with a substitution. We have not defined constant specifications-the rest of this paragraph is for those who know what they are, and it plays no role in the rest of this paper. Suppose C is a constant specification, A is an axiom, and c: ∅ A is added to a proof using Axiom Necessitation, where this addition meets constant specification C. Since Aσ is also an axiom, Axiom Necessitation allows us to add c: ∅ Aσ to a proof, but this may no longer meet specification C. However a new constant specification, which we can call Cσ, can be computed from the original one-c: ∅ Aσ ∈ Cσ just in case c: ∅ A ∈ C. Even if C was axiomatically appropriate, Cσ need not be, but if C is axiomatically appropriate, C ∪ Cσ will be. So, if A is provable using an axiomatically appropriate constant specification the same will be true for Aσ. From now on we suppress such details. Definition 11.1 Let A be a formula of L AM . A substitution σ lives on A provided, for every justification variable p k in the domain of σ, k occurs in A. Also σ lives away from A provided, for every justification variable p k in the domain of σ, k does not occur in A. We say σ meets the no new variable condition provided, for every p in the domain of σ, the justification term pσ contains no variables other than p.
There are a few simple results concerning these notions that will be useful in the next section.
Lemma 11.2 Assume
A is a formula of L AM , σ A is a substitution that lives on A, and σ Z is a substitution that lives away from A.
2. If both σ A and σ Z meet the no new variable condition, then
Proof Part 1: The proof is by induction on the complexity of A. The atomic case is trivial since no justification variables are present, and the ⊃ and quantifier cases are straightforward. This leaves the modal cases. Suppose A = n B, and the result is known for simpler formulas. First assume that T p n :
Part 2: Assume the hypothesis, and let p be a justification variable; we show pσ A σ Z = pσ Z σ A .
First, suppose p = p k where k occurs in A. Since σ A meets the no new variable condition, the only justification variable that can occur in pσ A is p. Since σ Z lives away from A, pσ Z = p, and so
Second, suppose p = p k where k does not occur in A. Since σ A lives on A, pσ A = p. And since σ Z meets the no new variable condition, p is the only variable that can occur in pσ Z . Then pσ Z σ A = pσ Z , and pσ A σ Z = pσ Z , so pσ A σ Z = pσ Z σ A in this case too.
The Realization Theorem Itself
We have already shown a Quasi-Realization Theorem, in 9.2 and 9.3. We now use this to get a proper Realization Theorem. The key construction is embodied in the proof of Theorem 12.1-how it gives Realization is the simple content of Theorem 12.4. Since the work here is entirely constructive we give it as an algorithm, followed by a verification of its correctness. Parameters play no role in this section. {x,y} A(x, y) ∨ t: {x,y} A(x, y)] and F p 2 : ∅ ⊥ ⊃ (∀x)u: {x,y} A(x, y) are in F 2 ⊥ ⊃ (∀x) 1 A(x, y) , where s, t, and u are justification terms. In a similar way,
. And in fact, the following is provable in FOLP, where σ is the empty substitution.
Noting Example 8.5, we have that the quasi-realization of 2 
provably implies the normal realization in FOLP
though neither is a theorem separately.
The algorithm that follows shows how to construct an appropriate formula A and a substitution σ, as used in Theorem 12.1. It proceeds by induction on the formula complexity of A-proof complexity plays no role here. The atomic case is simple, but for the other cases we make use of some notation to schematically present the construction for each case. The detailed meaning of the notation is fully spelled out in the correctness proof that follows, but here is a reading for the F ⊃ case, as an example. Suppose formula A is B ⊃ C, each of F A 1 , . . . , F A k is in F A , and each A i is B i ⊃ C i (and hence T B i ∈ T B and F C i ∈ F C ). Suppose also that it has already been established that B ⊃ (B 1 ∧ . . . ∧ B k )σ B and (C 1 ∨ . . . ∨ C k )σ C ⊃ C are provable. Then the formula (A 1 ∨ . . . ∨ A k )σ ⊃ A will also be provable, where σ = σ B σ C and
Now here is the algorithm, with a correctness proof following. It is assumed that all formulas are in L F OLP . 
Proof of correctness for Algorithm 12.3 We justify each non-atomic case of the algorithm, and along the way fully supply the meaning for the schematics used in the formulation of the algorithm as given above.
F ⊃ Suppose A is (B ⊃ C) and F A 1 , . . . , F A k ∈ F A . For each i, say A i = (B i ⊃ C i ); it follows that T B i ∈ T B and F C i ∈ F C . Assume there are substitutions σ B and σ C , living on B and C respectively and meeting the no new variable condition, and there are B and C with
We will also show that both σ and A meet the required conditions. (As noted above, all this is what is embodied in the F ⊃ schematic of the algorithm as noted above.)
Since A = (B ⊃ C) is a formula of L AM , and in annotated formulas indexes can appear only once, then B and C have no indexes in common, and so σ B and σ C have disjoint domains. In particular, σ B lives on B and so lives away from C, while σ C lives on C and so lives away from B. Let σ be σ B σ C = σ C σ B (these are equal by Lemma 11.2). It is easy to see that σ lives on B ⊃ C and meets the no new variable condition.
] , completing the case.
where F B i ∈ F B and T C i ∈ T C . Assume there are substitutions σ B living on B, and σ C living on C, both meeting the no new variable condition, and there are B and C with
As in the previous case, if we set σ = σ B σ C = σ C σ B , the following is provable:
, and this is enough to establish this case. We will show A ⊃ (A 1 ∧. . .∧A k )σ is provable, where σ = σ B {p n /(s·p n )} and A = p n : X B {p n /(s · p n )}, for a particular s that is specified below. We will also show σ and A meet the required conditions. The construction and proof above trace back to Proposition 7.8 in [5] , with a modification and correction supplied in [7] . Of course the present version is for FOLP, while the earlier one was only for LP. Now realization is an easy consequence.
Theorem 12.4 (Realization) Every formula of L M that is provable in firstorder S4 has a normal realization that is provable in FOLP.
Proof Suppose B is a theorem of first-order S4. We can assume B is closed, since if it is not, a construction similar to that in the proof of Corollary 9.3 can be applied. Let A be an annotated version of B. Then from Corollary 9.2, there are U 1 , . . . , U k with F U 1 , . . . , F U k ∈ F A such that U 1 ∨ . . . ∨ U k is a theorem of FOLP. By part 2 of Theorem 12.1 there is a substitution σ and a formula A with F A ∈ [ [ F A ] ] such that (U 1 ∨ . . . ∨ U k )σ ⊃ A is a theorem of FOLP. Since (U 1 ∨ . . . ∨ U k )σ is also provable in FOLP, so is A , and this is a normal realization of A, and hence of B.
Future Work
The Realization Theorem proof given here for FOLP is non-constructive because of the use made of the Model Existence Theorem. In a subsequent paper we will explore the constructive content of the argument, and its extensions to other justification logics. Extensions to multi-agent justification logics may also be considered. The conversion from quasi-realizations to realizations, which is constructive, will also be explored further. It is probable that a modular, constructive method can be extracted from the present work, somewhat similar to [11] , but of a simpler nature.
